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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal cor-~ 
poration, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellant. j 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
No. 6376 
UPON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UT.A_H IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
HONORABLE BRYAN P. LEVERICH, JUDGE 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal taken by the Defendant and Ap-
pellant from a judgment rendered in favor of the Plain-
tiff and Respondent by the District Court of Salt Lake 
County. 
The action 'vas brought by the Plaintiff, Salt Lake 
City. a municipal corporation, to quiet title to a certain 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
parcel of real property in Salt Lake City, County of Salt 
Lake, State of Utah, particularly described as follows: 
All of lots eight (8), nine (9) and ten (10), in 
Block 2, Plat "K", Salt Lake City Survey. 
The property above described was conveyed to the 
State of Utah by Salt Lake City on or about the 9th day 
of July, A. D., 1895, in an indenture which is set forth 
at page 1 '7 of the Abstract of the Record and is as follows: 
"This Indenture made the ninth day of July, 
A. D. 1895, between Salt Lake City, a municipal 
corporation in the Territory of Utah, the party of 
the first part, and the Territory of Utah, the party 
of the second part, witnesseth: 
"That whereas Salt Lake City a municipal 
corporation in the Territory of Utah the Grantor 
herein is the owner of the real estate and property 
hereinafter fully described, and whereas, the said 
City has agreed to convey the said property to the 
Territory of Utah, on the conditions and for the 
purposes set forth in the following report of a 
special committee of said City Council, duly ap-
pointed by said Council and the action of said 
Council on said report, to-wit: 
"Your Special Committee to confer with the 
Governor and the Legislative Assembly to provide 
for the transfer of certain land to the Territory of 
Utah one acre of ground on the east side of State 
Street and immediately south of the Capitol 
Grounds and in such shape as may be acceptable 
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. 3 
to the Territory, said ground to be used for the site 
of Executive Mansion. 
"We also recommend that the deed of said 
site carry with it the free use of City water for the 
grounds and Mansion. 
Respectifully submitted 
1'1. K. Parsons 
James Anderson 
W. P. Lynn 
"On motion of Councilman Pendleton, the 
report was adopted and the l\1ayor given authority 
to sign the deed, under the conditions specified. 
"Roll call on vote stood as follows: Ayes: 
"Councilman Parsons, Pendleton, Spafford, 
Anderson, Pickard, Heath, Hyde, Folland, F arrick, 
Lynn and James." 
AND, WHEREAS: the Legislative Assembly 
of the Territory of Utah adopted a joint resolution 
accepting said property upon the conditions and 
for the purposes, as specified in the report of the 
said Special Committee and the action of the City 
Council of said Salt Lake City on said report now 
therefore, in consideration of the premises, and the 
sum of One Dollar in hand paid by the said second 
party, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged; 
and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell, con-
vey and confirm unto the said Territory of Utah, 
the party of the second part, the following de-
scribed real estate and property, to-wit: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
"All of Lots eight (8) nine (9) and ten (10) in 
Block two, Plat "K" Salt Lake- City Survey the 
same being situated and lying in Salt Lake City, 
and County, 1'erritory of Utah, and also a sufficient 
supply of water for use on said premises and any 
building or buildings that may hereafter be erected 
thereon free of cost to the party of the second part, 
so long as said premises shall he used for a mansion 
or residence by the Executive of said Territory, or 
the State of Utah. 
"But in case said property shall not be used 
by said Territory or State for an Executive Man-
sion or residence, then this deed shall become void 
and of no effect and said property with all the im-
provements and appurtenances thereon or thereto 
belonging shall revert to and become the property 
of the said party as fully and absolutely as if this 
deed had not been made. 
"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said Salt Lake 
City by its Mayor, R.N. Baskin has hereunto signed 
and caused the Seal of Salt Lake City to be here-
unto affixed in pursuance of the foregoing report 
of said Special Committee and the resolution of 
the City Council of Said City adopting said report. 
Signed in Presence of 
Attest: W. A. McKay 
Salt Lake City 
By R. N. BASKIN 
Mayor. 
G. H. Backman City Recorder 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
SALT LAKE CITY SEAL" 
A certified copy of the above Indenture was received 
in evidence by the Court and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 
"C." 
The Court also received in evidence Plaintiff's Ex-
hibit "A" as indicated in the exhibit list at page 21 of the 
record and which is an Indenture by and between Jennie 
J. Kearns, widow of Salt Lake City, State of Utah, party 
of the first part, and the State of Utah, the party of the 
second part, wherein Jennie J. Kearns conveyed a cer-
tain parcel of real property situated in Salt Lake City, 
and the dwelling house located thereon, unto the State 
of Utah; this gift was accepted by the State pursuant to 
a legislative act kno,vn as Senate Bill Number 236, Chap-
ter 151, Laws of Utah, 193'7. The act recited that the Jen-
nie J. Kearns' property was to be used as a residence 
for the Governor. 
In view of the provisions in the deed between the 
City and the State which is as follows: 
"But in case said property shall not be used 
by said Territory or State for an Executive Man-
sion or residence, then this deed shall become void 
and of no effect and said property with all the im-
provements and appurtenances thereon or thereto 
belonging shall revert to and become the property 
of the said party as fully and absolutely as if this 
deed had not been made." 
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and the evidence offered by the City that the State had 
accepted other property as a residence for the Governor, 
the court below rendered its decision in favor of the 
Plaintiff City and that decision is the subject of this 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
1. The court erred in making and entering its find-
ing of fact numbered 6, (page 26, Record), to-wit: 
"That the said defendant State of Utah aban-
doned the use of said real property conveyed to it 
by Salt Lake City for an executive mansion or res-
idence as aforesaid and by the acceptance of the 
said real property conveyed to it by Jennie J. 
Kearns as aforesaid and the use by the State of 
- Utah as its executive mansion or residence for its 
Governor did terminate its fee in the deed convey-
ing the real property from Salt Lake City plaintiff 
to the State of Utah as aforesaid," 
for the reason that the finding is based on the fact that 
the State had accepted the Jennie J. Kearns' property 
to be used as a governor's mansion, and said finding is 
contrary to law. 
2. That the Court erred in making its conclusion 
of law, numbered 1, (page 26, Record) as follows, to-wit: 
"That by reason of the State of Utah defend-
ant accepting the land described in the conveyance 
by Jennie J. Kearns to the State of Utah and re-
corded in Book 198 of Deeds, pages 4 70-1. in the 
office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County 
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and dated April 28, 193?', pursuant to Chapter 151, 
Laws of Utah, 193?', the said real property described 
in the deed from the plaintiff Salt Lake City to 
the defendant State of Utah dated July 9, 1895, 
conveying Lots 8, 9 and 10, Block 2, Plat 'K,' Salt 
Lake City Survey, has reverted to and become the 
property of the plaintiff Salt Lake City." 
3. That the Court erred making the following judg-
ment, (page 28 of the Record), to-wit: 
"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AD JUDGED 
AND DECREED: 
1. That the plaintiff herein, Salt Lake City, is 
the· owner of that certain lot or parcel of land sit-
uated, lying and being in the County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, and bounded and described as fol-
lows, to-wit: 
"2. That the defendant State of Utah has no inter-
est or estate in said land or any part thereof and 
that the title of the plaintiff in and to said real 
property is good and valid. 
"3. That the defendent State of Utah is hereby 
forever enjoined and debarred from asserting any 
claim whatever in and to said land or premises." 
ARGUMF;NT ONE 
THE INDENTURE CONVEYING THE PROP-
ERTY TO THE STATE OPERATED TO CONVEY TO 
THE STATE OF UTAH A BASE FEE OR FEE DETER-
MINABLE SUBJECT TO A SPECIAL LIMITATION 
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WITH A POSSIBILITY OF REVERTER IN FAVOR 
OF THE CITY AS GRANTOR. 
The deed in question states therein: 
"But in case said property shall not he used by 
said terri tory or state, for an Executive Mansion or 
residence then this deed shall become void and of 
no effect. -J: -J: *" (Italics added) 
Such a deed provides for termination of the estate 
of the grantee by operation of law, not by act of the 
parties, and, therefore, the estate granted to the State of 
Utah is a fee determinable with a special limitation. A 
"base" fee or a fee determinable terminates upon a spe-
cial limitation; that is to say, that the State of Utah has 
ownership of the property with all the attributes of a 
fee simple estate which will be determined upon the hap-
pening of a certain event; it is subject to one special limi-
tation and that limitation alone. The city as grantor by 
such a deed reserved unto itself a mere possibility of re-
verter. Reference may he made to "Restatement of the 
Law of Property" wherein in Section 23 a definition of 
the term "special limitation" is set forth: 
"The term 'special limitation' denotes that 
part of the language of a conveyance 'vhich causes 
the created interest automatically to expire upon 
the occurence of a stated event, and thus provides 
for a terminability in addition to that normally 
characteristic of such interest." 
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Note (b) of Section 23 specifies: 
"Automatic expiration consists, historically, 
in the ending of an interest in accordance with the 
terms of its creating limitations." 
The courts have recognized that such an estate may 
be created. Reference may be made to the case of Y ar-
borough vs. Yarborough, 151 Tenn. 221; 269 S. W. 36, 
where the court devotes much of the opinion to an anal-
ysis of the characteristics of such an estate and states: 
"There remains the question as to whether 
the estate attempted to be created by the convey-
ancy before us was an estate upon condition or an 
estate upon conditional limitation. 
"The distinction between an estate upon con-
dition and a conditional limitation is thus drawn 
by Mr. Washburn: 
"'In this and many other respects, an estate 
upon condition, properly speaking, differs from 
what is known as a conditional limitation. In 
either case, the estate is a conditional one. But in 
the one, though the event happen upon which the 
estate may be defeated, it requires some act to be 
done, such as making an entry, in order to effect 
this. In the other, the happening of the event is, 
in itself, the limit beyond which the estate no 
longer exists, but is determined by the operation of 
the law, without requiring any act to be done by 
any one. In case of a condition at common law, the 
grantor or his heirs alone can defeat the estate by 
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entry for condition broken. In a conditional limi-
tation, the estate determines, ipso facto, upon the 
happening of the event, and goes over at once to 
the grantor by reverter, or to the person to whom it 
is limited upon the happening of such contin-
, ,, gency. 
See also 296 N. Y. Sup. 341, page 350, and ?? A. L. R. 
345, (Note 2); 51 A. L. R. 1466 and 14?3. 
ARGUMENT TWO 
THAT THE STATE HAD ABANDONED THE 
PROPERTY WAS AN ERRONEOUS FINDING OF 
FACT. 
The finding of the court below that the appellant 
herein had abandoned the use of the property conveyed 
to it by the respondent, and that the fee of the appellant 
terminated upon the acceptance of the Kearns' property 
was not supported by competent evidence which could 
justify such a finding and is contrary to law. 
It is well settled that an abandonment is the inten-
tional relinquishment of a known right, and that an, aban-
donment cannot give title to any other person or party, 
hut merely throws the property open to the public do-
main. See Del Giorgio vs. Powers, 2? Cal. App. (2d) 668, 
81 Pac. (2d) 1006. 
In Thompso~ on Real Property (Perm. Ed.) Vol. S 
P. 310, Section 2566, it is stated: 
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"The characteristic element of abandonment 
is the voluntary relinquishment of ownership. It 
depends on an intention to abandon or relinquish, 
coupled with son1e overt act or some failure to act, 
"rhich carries the implication that the owner 
neither claims nor retains any interest in the sub-
ject-matter of the abandonment. In order to justify 
the conclusion that there has been abandonment 
of property, there must be some clear and unmis-
takable affirmative act indicating a purpose to 
repudiate the ownership thereof. It must be re-
membered that intent to relinquish ownership is 
a material element in abandonment. ..~: .. ~: .. ~:" 
See also Kimberlin vs. Hicks, 150 Kan. 449, 94 Pac. 
(2d) 335, at 338, wherein the court stated: 
"It was alleged that Eli abandoned his right 
to use the real estate on or about August, 193?, and 
moved to a town; that he made application for old 
age assistance in which he stated that he did not 
own, and had no interest in, any real estate. It is 
argued that his interest in the real estate was ex-
tinguished by abandonment and that the interest 
of the remaindermen was accelerated. 
"In 1 C. J. S., Abandonment. Vol. 1, page 4, aban-
donment is defined: 'Abandonment of property or 
a right is the voluntary relinquishment thereof by 
its owner or holder, with the intention of terminat-
ing his ownership, possession and control, and with-
out vesting ownership in any other person.' 
"A title in fee simple cannot be lost by mere 
abandonment~ Barrett vs. Coal Co., '70 Kan. 649, 
?9 P. 150, and abandonment is not usually men-
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tioned as a methed by which a life estate may be 
extinguished, Restatement, Property, Section 152; 
21 C. J. 969. In Spencer vs. Smith, 74 Kan. 142, 145, 
85 P. 573, it is stated that as a general rule title to 
land cannot be lost by abandonment." 
ARGUMENrf THREE 
CONSTRUCTION OF A DEED MUST BE MOST 
FAVORABLE TO THE GRAN1'EE AND FORFEI-
TURES ARE NOT FAVORED. 
In construing a deed, the grant must be construed 
most favorably to the grantee. See Blackman vs. Striker, 
142 N. Y. 55, 560 N. E. 484. 
In construing a deed forfeitures are not favored. 
Therefore, in analyzing the deed from the City to the 
State, we must do so in accordance with the long estab-
lished basic doctrines, that forfeitures are not favored, 
but abhorred in the law. Van De Bogart vs. Reformed 
Dutch Church of Poughkeepsie, 219 Appellate Div. 225; 
220 N. Y. Sup. 58; 115 N. Y. 361; 22 N. E. 145; 5 L. R. A. 
422; 12 American State Rpts. 809. 
The importance of forfeitures is none the less be-
cause a deed was given without consideration. See 116 
A. L. R. 6?. 
From the foregoing long established rules of law 
concerning the construction of deeds, it is the contention 
of appellant that the court must lean toward the con-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
struction most favorable to the grantee. That- is, it 1nust 
not only be aware of the deed, but also that should it-
uphold the verdict of the court below the appellant will 
suffer a forfeiture. The court n1ust, therefore, make a 
reasonable search for any reason, with regard to both 
the facts and the la''' which ,, ... ould give it grounds to de-
feat the forfeiture. 
ARGUMENT FOUR 
THE POSSIBILITY OF REVERTER IN FAVOR 
OF RESPONDENT MAY ONLY ARISE BY- MISUSER 
AND NOT BY NON-USER. 
The court below made its conclusion of law to the 
effect that the property in question had reverted to and 
become the property of the respondent city upon the ac-
ceptance by the State of the property of Jennie J. Kearns; 
this was undoubtedly based upon the erroneous conclu-
sion that since the State had not made use of the property 
for a Governor's Mansion and had accepted by- legisla-
tive act a gift of another portion of property to be used 
for the home of the Governor, that this fact gave rise to 
the possibility of reverter outlined hy the special limita-
tion clause in the deed. That is to say, that when the-State 
acquired a Governor's Mansion, that it would no longer 
use the property that was given to it by the city. It is-
the contention of appellant that the possibility- of reverter 
in the city may not arise until the_ State of Utah uses the 
property for some other purpose than a Governor's Man-
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sion. This contention is confirmed and substantia ted by the 
fact that the deed recites: 
"But in case said property s h a ll n o t be 
used***" 
This can only be construed as meaning some time 
in the future with no definite limitation. Reference may 
be made to Vol. 6, "Words and Phrases," (Perm. Ed.), 
p. 213, 
"'A case' in ordinary parlance is that which 
follows, comes, or happens; or an event." 
The city councilmen and the mayor who executed 
the deed knew, and must have anticipated the fact, that 
there might be a considerable passage of time before the 
State of Utah could build a suitable home for the execu-
tive. The deed confirms this in expressing: 
"But in case said property shall not be used 
by said territory or the State for an executive man-
sion or residence """ -J: *" (Italics added) 
Surely the framers of this deed, executed at the time 
Utah was a territory, must have intended that some time 
would pass before use of the property could be made 
properly because the deed itself included reference to 
both territory and state. The fact that the State of Utah 
recently accepted a gift of a home to be used as the Gov-
ernor's Mansion is not proof or worthy evidence that the 
State does not intend to use the property as shown in 
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Exhibit "C" for the purposes to "chich said conveyance 
is limited. The residence no"T used by the Governor n1a y 
be vacated at some immediate future time, and as long 
as the State of Utah has not used or attempted to use the 
property "Thich is the subject of this action for any other 
use, the possibility of reverter n1ay not arise in the city. 
In the case of McKissick vs. Pickle, 16 Pa. St. Rep. 
140, an individual granted and conveyed a lot of ground 
to certain persons in trust, upon which erection of a school 
house, and house of public worship was to take place for 
the benefit of the public; the deed providing that should 
the property be converted into any other use other than 
a school house and a building for education of youths, 
and a meeting-house for promulgating the gospel, and 
also a burying-ground, and such other improvements as 
may be advantageous and of use to the promotion of the 
aforesaid three objects, that then and in that case, the 
said lot shall revert to the party of the first part and to 
his heirs and assigns. There was competent evidence pre-
sented to the court that for many years no school had 
been taught in the building nor had any religious ser-
vices been conducted. The court in construing this deed 
u~ed the following language: 
"The proviso in the deed is entitled to a fair, 
liberal, and benign interpretation, not according 
to its letter, but its spirit. Viewing it in this aspect, 
I cannot bring myself to believe that it was in the 
conte1nplation of the parties (the grantor and those 
who contributed- the funds to the erection of the 
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building) that an occasional use of the property by 
a tenant at will, for purposes other than those 
mentioned in the deed, would work a forfeiture of 
the estate. To produce that effect, it must be by 
some permanent use different from those enumer-
ated in the deed, such for example, as converting 
the building into a factory, or the land attached 
to it into arable land or pasture. The grant, being 
for a charity, could not be forfeited for non-user, 
nor for misuser except under an express condition 
or contract; and although, in the latter case, it may, 
yet it must he clearly, expressly, and strictly shown 
that the condition was broken; 5 Watts 493, Martin 
vs. McCord; 9 Barr, 433, Wright vs. Linn. The law 
raises every intendment in favor of a charity, 
against the grantor or those claiming under him; 
public schools intended for the children in the 
neighborhood are favorites in this State, and must 
receive the protection and support as far as is rea-
sonable, of the public tribunals. It must be kept 
in view, that it is a misuser and not a non-user, 
which produces the forfeiture. So runs the deed. 
Throwing therefore, the non-user out of considera· 
tion, what is the evidence of misuser," (Italics 
added) 
Of course, strictly speaking, the gift of the property 
to the State of Utah was not a charitable gift but it was 
motivated as a matter of civic pride, not only to the ad-
vantage of the State hut likewise to the city by insuring 
that the Governor of the State would reside in the City, 
and that a suitable location for the Governor's home 
would be found. It is the contention of appellant that 
there is a possibility that the property will be used some 
time in the future for a site of the Governor's residence, 
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and as long as that possibility exists, it cuts short the pos-
sibil:ity of reverter in favor of the city. Until that possi-
bility is completely extinguished the special lin1itation in 
favor of the city may not arise. See Vol. 2, Miner's Insti-
tutes, p. "!?, 1 Lomaxes Digest, p. 331, wherein Littleton 
says: 
"It is called a condition 'vhen something is 
given on an uncertain event which may or may not 
come into existence. ~-: -.-: *" 
The city does not have reversion, it can only have as 
distinguished therefrom a possibility of reverter, which 
according to modern technical notion arises upon a grant 
so limited that it may last forever or may terminate upon 
a condition or contingency. It is only the possibility of 
gaining the fee again which exists in the grantor after 
the grant of a determinable or qualified fee. See Vol. 2, 
C. J., p. 1017. See also Miner's on Real Property, (2d) 1012. 
When was the possibility of reverter to the grantor 
to he brought to a head? The answer is: At the instant 
when there no longer remains the possibility of the estate 
remaining absolute in the grantee under the terms of the 
deed. That time could only arise when the State, as 
grantee, uses the property for some purpose other than 
a Governor's Mansion. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, based upon the foregoing authorities, 
having in mind that the law abhores a forfeiture, it is the 
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contention of the appellant that the court erred in finding 
that the possibility of reverter has arisen, because of the 
fact that there is still a "possibility" (in fact a certainty) 
that the State of Utah will yet use the property described 
in Exhibit "C" for the purposes set forth therein, and 
that until the State of Utah attempts to use the property 
for some other purpose, the special limitation has not 
consummated itself or come to life, and that the property J 
still belongs to and is owned by the State of Utah in fee 
simple determinable, and that the decision of the court 
below should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GROVER A. GILES 
Attorney General 
S. D. HUFFAKER 
Deputy Attorney General 
A. JOHN BRENNAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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